Table of Contents

Introduction
I. Research Topic
II. Problems and Their Background
III. Main Contents
IV. Research Methods
V.Innovative Features
VI. Problems
Chapter 1 An Overview of Exclusive Dealing and the Trend of Competition Regulation
1.Definition of exclusive dealing
1.1 Definitions of exclusive dealing at home and abroad
1.2 Distinction between exclusive dealing and tying, loyalty rebates, and franchising
1.3 Legal definition of exclusive dealing in this paper
1.4 Explanation of the economic theories of exclusive dealing
2.Legal rules of major countries or regions on exclusive dealing
2.1 Provisions on exclusive dealing under the US antitrust law
2.2 EU competition law provisions on exclusive dealing
2.3 Provisions on exclusive dealing in the competition laws of Japan, the Republic of Korea and Singapore
3.The history, current status, and future of regulating exclusive dealing in major countries or regions
3.1 The determination of the legality of exclusive dealing focuses on market power and the degree of blocking
3.2 The focus of analyzing exclusive dealing has shifted from forms to effects
3.3 The enforcement targets of exclusive dealing in the digital age are platforms and digital ecosystems
Chapter summary
Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework for Analyzing Competitive Effects of Exclusive Dealing
1. Identification of exclusive dealing
1.1 Analysis of the elements of exclusive dealing
1.2 Specific forms of exclusive dealing
2. Regulatory approaches for exclusive dealing
2.1 Regulation under the anti-competitive agreement framework and key considerations
2.2 Regulation under dominance abuse framework and key considerations
2.3 Main differences between the two regulation frameworks
2.4 Considerations in selecting an appropriate regulatory approach
3.The theories of competitive harm of exclusive dealing
3.1 Basic theories of competitive harm of exclusive dealing
3.2 Forms of competitive harm of exclusive dealing
3.3 Analysis methodology and identifying elements for competitive harm of exclusive dealing
4.Efficiency claims for exclusive dealing
4.1 Types of efficiencies and efficiency trade-off
4.2 Standards for efficiency defense
4.3 The practical dilemma of efficiency defense
4.4 Efficiency analysis of exclusive dealing
Chapter summary
Chapter 3 Competition Analysis of Platforms’Exclusive Dealing under the Two-sided Market Theory
1. Introduction of the two-sided market theory
1.1 Concept of two-sided market and its differences with one-sided market
1.2 Cross-network effect is an essential feature of two-sided market
1.3 Two-sided dependence is the value basis of two-sided markets
1.4 Number of users is the source of power in the two-sided market
1.5 Exclusivity strategy is a means of competition in two-sided markets
2.Two-sided market characteristics of platforms: Take the e-commerce platform as an example
2.1 Business model and competitive characteristics of the platform
2.2 The platform needs to gain critical mass
2.3 Platforms need to exert network effects
3.Mechanism analysis of the platform’s implementation of exclusive dealing
3.1 Capability analysis: commercial dependence and platform’s “private power”
3.2 Motivation analysis: anti-competition and coping with competition
4.The particularity of the implementation of exclusive dealing by platforms
4.1 The implementation of exclusive dealing on the platform is asymmetrical in behavior
4.2 The platforms’implementation of exclusive dealing has the concealment of means
4.3 The platform’s implementation of exclusive dealing has an interactive impact
4.4 The platform’s implementation of exclusive dealing is technically intelligent
5.The implementation of exclusive dealing by platforms harms competition
5.1 Limit the adequacy and effectiveness of market competition
5.2 Infringe the legitimate rights and interests of the on-platform merchants
5.3 Infringe the legitimate rights and interests of end users
5.4 Inhibiting the economic vitality of platforms will hinder the construction of a domestic unified market
Chapter summary
Chapter 4 Challenges, Responses and Reflection Related to Law Enforcement Practice of Competition Regulations on Platform Exclusive Dealing
1.Difficulties in defining relevant markets in a two-sided market, and methods of improvement
1.1 Challenges in defining relevant markets for platforms
1.2 Failure of traditional methods in defining platform-related market
1.3 New approaches to define platform-related markets
1.4 Experience and reflection of Chinese law enforcement agencies on defining platform-related markets
2.Dilemma and regulatory revisions in determining market dominance in a two-sided market
2.1 Dilemma of identifying dominant position in platform markets
2.2 Possible new factors to consider for determining dominant position of platform markets
2.3 Revisions in regulations for determining dominant market position of platform markets
2.4 Experience of and reflection on Chinese law enforcement authorities’determination of dominant position
3.Challenges and path optimization for analysis of exclusive dealings under two-sided market conditions
3.1 Challenges in evaluating the competitive effect of exclusive dealings on platforms
3.2 Path optimization for evaluating competition effect of platforms’exclusive dealings
3.3 Experience of and reflection on competitive effect analysis of online-platform exclusive dealings by Chinese law enforcement authorities
Chapter summary
Chapter 5 The Shift in Extraterritorial Policy on Platform Competition Regulation and the Choice of Regulatory Pathways in China
1.New competition regulation of foreign platforms under the influence of the New Brandeis School
1.1 Platform economy poses challenges to global competition regulation
1.2 The rise of the New Brandeis School: the return to structuralism and the identification of formal criteria
1.3 The latest development in competition regulation of online platforms in major countries and regions
1.4 An analysis comparing regulation models for platform competition: the EU and the US